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The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) is grateful for the opportunity to 
provide input to the Working Group regarding elements for guidance on human rights 
defenders and the role of business. As a joint center of Columbia Law School and the 
Earth Institute, we focus on international investment and its impacts on sustainable 
development. In this context, we are increasingly concerned about the repression and 
criminalization of human rights defenders in the context of investment projects—a 
situation that unfortunately seems to show no sign of abating. 
 
Our input focuses on one specific topic that we believe may be overlooked in general 
discussions about human rights defenders: the possibility that the international investment 
law regime, comprised of thousands of bilateral and multilateral treaties, may actually 
exacerbate the potential for repression and criminalization of human rights defenders. 
This concern was raised at a one-day roundtable hosted by CCSI and the Working Group 
in October 2017,1 and we believe it merits further exploration.   
 
Investment treaties serve to place standards on how governments may treat foreign 
investors. Investor-state arbitration permits foreign investors to directly enforce, typically 
without first exhausting (or even commencing) domestic remedies, these standards by 
suing the government hosting their investment for actions taken (or not taken) by that 
government that have a negative impact on the investment or profits (including future lost 
profits) of the investment. However, the standards contained in investment treaties are 
notoriously vague, and arbitration tribunals are inconsistent, and even contradictory, in 
how they interpret and apply these standards against governments. As such, it is difficult, 
if not impossible in many cases, for governments to anticipate when their actions (taken 
by executive, legislative, or judicial authorities, at any level of government, and even if a 
government actor is acting outside of its/his/her domestic legal or constitutional 
authorization) may trigger liability. Investors often initiate investor-state legal actions, 
and tribunals make awards that are adverse to governments or governments choose to 
settle the claim, in instances when the government has taken the action in question with 
the intent of realizing social, environmental, or human rights objectives or obligations, 
                                                        
1 Further information available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2017/10/18/roundtable-on-impacts-of-
the-investment-regime-on-access-to-justice/ (workshop outcome document forthcoming). 
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but such action also negatively impacted a foreign investor or investment.2 Furthermore, 
governments may face claims by multiple investors based on the same action, or, because 
many investment treaties have wide definitions of “investor,” it is possible that 
governments may face claims by a company as well as its direct and/or indirect 
shareholders for the same action, thus rendering liability even more uncertain.3 
 
On average each such investor-state claim costs nearly US$6 million for a government to 
defend,4 and even if the government prevails in the case,5 tribunals are less likely to shift 
arbitration costs to the losing investor when the state successfully defends the claim than 
they would be to shift costs to the state if the investor had prevailed.6 Even in cases where 
a tribunal does shift costs to the unsuccessful investor claimant, governments can have a 
difficult time recouping the funds that they expended in defending the case.7 Of course, 
when a state loses a claim costs are much higher, typically in the millions or even billions 
of dollars. These awards are highly enforceable in courts around the world, and there is 
no appeal from an adverse award available. Furthermore, one study found that the mere 
                                                        
2 E.g. Bear Creek v.  Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award (Nov. 30, 2017) (failure to grant 
concession amid social unrest); Windstream v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2013-22, Award (Sept. 27, 
2016) (moratorium on offshore wind investments amid environmental uncertainty); Bilcon v. 
Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (March 17, 
2015) (refusal of permit for quarry because of local opposition); Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, PCA 
Case No. 2012-2, Award (Mar. 15, 2016) (revocation of mining concessions amid social unrest); 
TransCanada v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21, settled (2016) (failure to grant oil 
pipeline permit amid social opposition); Occidental v. Ecuador, ICSID Case. No. ARB/06/11, 
Award (Oct. 5, 2012) (termination of oil concession amid social unrest); Vattenfall v. Germany 
(I), ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Award (settlement) (March 11, 2011) (environmental restrictions 
on coal-fired power plant). 
3 David Gaukrodger, “Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims: Analysis of Treaty Practice,” 
OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2014/03 (2014). 
4 See, among others, Jeffrey P Commission, ‘How Much Does an ICSID Arbitration Cost? A 
Snapshot of the Last Five Years’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 29 February 2016) 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/02/29/how-much-does-an-icsid-arbitration-cost-a-
snapshot-of-the-last-five-years/ accessed 27 February 2018. The cost to defend a case can greatly 
increase based on complexity of issues raised in the case. 
5 Of all concluded cases, one third were decided in favor of the State (i.e. the claim was dismissed 
either on jurisdictional ground or on the merits). In one quarter of cases, investors won and were 
awarded compensation. One quarter of all cases were settled. Of the remaining cases, either the 
case was discontinued or the tribunal found that the treaty was breached but did not award 
compensation. UNCTAD World Investment Report 2017, at 117, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf. 
6 Matthew Hodgson, “Counting the costs of investment treaty arbitration,” Global Arbitration 
Review” (Mar. 24, 2014) at 7.  
7 Memorandum from I. Zarak A. to M. Kinnear, Re: Effective Protection for Respondent States 
Against Judgment-Proof Claimants, dated Sept. 12, 2016. Statistics cited by Panama indicate that 
among thirty-five respondent states that had been granted costs awards since Dec. 31, 2013, 49% 
had been paid in full, 14% had been paid in part, and 37% had not been paid at all. 
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filing of an ISDS claim against a state is connected with reduced inward FDI flows, and 
that inward FDI flows drop even further when the state loses an ISDS case.8  
 
While more research is required, it is clear that investor-state arbitration under investment 
treaties can have high costs, both material and reputational, for host states, while benefits, 
including evidence of increased investment, remain uncertain and undemonstrated. 9 
Furthermore, when the potential for a very costly process and even more costly and 
highly enforceable awards are coupled with vague and inconsistently applied standards, it 
becomes clear how such a system may result in a situation in which a government is more 
likely to attend to and address the demands made by foreign investors at the expense of 
other competing interests, which can exacerbate tendencies toward intra-national 
inequality in favor of large corporations and at the expense of the rights of less powerful 
groups and individuals.10  
 
With respect to human rights defenders, there is a significant possibility that the 
international investment law regime may exacerbate repression and/or criminalization of 




One pertinent example comes from Peru, where local indigenous Aymara communities in 
Northern Puno have faced criminalization for their efforts to protect their rights and 
interests affected by the “Santa Ana” silver mining project, an investment of the 
Canadian company, Bear Creek Mining Corporation. Some Aymara community members 
and leaders from the region organized and mobilized to raise concerns regarding the 
project’s potential impacts on the local environment and water sources.11 Community 
members expressed opposition to the project in various ways, including by engagement 
with the regional government of Puno,12 at an information workshop in February 2011, 
and through peaceful protest.13 In March 2011, a more active social protest movement 
against the Santa Ana project began. The protests, widely known as “Aymarazo,” 
centered on the rights and interests affected by the project, and grew in intensity until – in 
June 2011 – the government revoked the decree of public necessity that was one of the 
legal prerequisites for Bear Creek’s ability to mine the Santa Ana project.14   
                                                        
8 Todd Allee and Clint Peinhardt, “Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty 
Violations on Foreign Direct Investment,” 65 International Organization 401 (2011).  
9 For a thorough discussion of the costs and benefits of ISDS see Joachim Pohl, “Societal benefits 
and costs of International Investment Agreements: A critical review of aspects and available 
empirical evidence,” OECD Working Papers on International Investment (2018). 
10  Lise Sachs and Lise Johnson, “Investment Treaties, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and 
Inequality: How International Rules and Institutions Can Exacerbate Domestic Disparities” 
(2018). 
11 Front Line Defenders, “Aymara Community Leaders on Trial,” (2017).   
12 Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Amicus 
Curiae Brief submitted by the Association of Human Rights and the Environment-Puno and Mr. 
Carlos Lopez, PhD (Non-Disputing Parties), p. 9.   
13 Id., pp. 5-8.  
14 Id., pp. 8-10.  
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In August 2014, Bear Creek filed an investor-state claim against Peru on the basis of the 
Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement (FTA), seeking in excess of US$ 500 million in 
damages for alleged expropriation of its investment, and breaches of other standards in 
the Canada-Peru FTA.15 In 2017, one of the most active years for the investor-state claim 
filed by Bear Creek (during which an award was rendered), at least 18 Aymara 
community members faced trial for obstruction of public services, aggravated extortion, 
and disruption of the peace.16 Walter Aduviri Calizaya, a prominent Aymara community 
leader and organizer, was sentenced to seven years in prison and a fine of two million 
soles (US$ 600,000).17 Concerns regarding Peru’s treatment of human rights defenders 
and groups engaged in social protests have been raised in the past.18 CCSI is carrying out 
research to better understand the extent to which the restrictions and pressures placed on 
the Peruvian government by the Canada-Peru FTA, and the financial, reputational, and 
political stakes associated with investor-state arbitration, may have influenced the actions 
taken with respect to Aymara community members.  
 
A second example comes from Ecuador.19 Here, a Canadian mining company, Copper 
Mesa, held interests in three projects in Ecuador’s Intag Valley where surrounding 
communities were strongly opposed to mining, including with respect to Copper Mesa’s 
projects. There were various violent incidents between the local communities and the 
private security guards hired by Copper Mesa as community members sought to protect 
their rights and interests by protesting the project and physically blocking the mining 
concessions. At one point, the situation became so violent that the private security 
company used tear gas and fired weapons at local villagers and officials. 20  Some 
community members who resisted the project were reportedly charged with crimes and 
                                                        
15 Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21.  
16 Front Line Defenders, “Aymara Community Leaders on Trial,” (2017); “Six Years After the 
‘Aymarazo’ Protets in Peru,” Intercontinental Cry (June 27, 2017).   
17 Business & Human Rights Resource Center, Human Rights Defenders Portal, Walter Aduviri 
Calizaya. The sentence was upheld on appeal in December 2017. La Ley, “Caso Aduviri: estudios 
superiores permiten inaplicar error de prohibición en población indígen,” (February 16, 2018). 
See also Sian Cowman and Aldo Orellana López, “Dura condena contra líder aymara devela 
política de criminalización de la protesta en Perú,” Derechos Humanos y Medio Ambiente Puno 
(July 30, 2017).  
18 It has been reported that, in days leading up to the Bagua massacre, the US State Department 
cited the Peru-US Free Trade Agreement in placing pressure on the Peruvian government to 
address protests by indigenous communities regarding mining in La Oroya, Peru. See Jose De 
Echave and Lori Wallach, “Peru’s ‘Bagua massacre’ haunts the TPP,” The Hill (June 11, 2014). 
Regarding concerns expressed with respect to Peru’s treatment of human rights defenders and 
social protesters, see generally: UN Working Group on Business & Human Rights, Statement at 
the end of visit to Peru by the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights 
(Lima, July 19, 2017); UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, Report on the 
situation of indigenous peoples’ rights in Peru with regard to the extractive industries, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/27/52/Add.3 (July 3, 2014).  
19 Copper Mesa Mining Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012-2, Award (15 
March 2016). 
20 Id., para. 4.265. 
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imprisoned, although were not eventually found guilty. As the conflict regarding the 
project escalated, the government halted the project without compensation; in response, 
Copper Mesa brought an investor-state claim against the Government of Ecuador among 
other things, alleging that the Government had breached its obligation to provide the 
foreign investor and its investment “full protection and security”.21  This standard in 
investment law is frequently interpreted to require the host state to provide physical 
protection and security to an investor.22 States do not have an absolute obligation akin to 
“strict liability” but an obligation more akin to an exercise of due diligence.23 However, 
this standard requires active conduct by the state and not merely inaction. In this case, the 
tribunal asked the question of whether Ecuador should have “imposed its will on the anti-
miners, acting with all the powers and forces available to a sovereign State, so as to 
ensure that [Copper Mesa], as the concessionaire under concessions granted by [Ecuador] 
could gain access to the Junín concessions in order to carry out the required consultations 
and other activities required for its EIS?” 24  The tribunal points that the risk to the 
investment from anti-miners in the area was “real, long-standing and well-known even 
before [Copper Mesa]’s Junín concessions; and that the State’s presence in the Junín area, 
including its police, was invariably weak, intermittent and ineffective.”25 Regardless, the 
Tribunal goes on to find that the Government of Ecuador has breached this obligation, 
noting that “[p]lainly, the Government in Quito could hardly have declared war on its 
own people. Yet, in the Tribunal’s view, it could not do nothing.”26 The Tribunal does 
acknowledge Copper Mesa’s contributory conduct in firing live ammunition on 
protestors, but rather than dismissing the claim, simply reduced damages against Ecuador 
(to US$ 19.4 million) to reflect the fact that Copper Mesa’s “negligence” in engaging 
with local communities contributed to the collapse of its project.27 While leaving the 
middle ground between declaring war on its own people and doing nothing open to 
interpretation, the tribunal has put a hefty price tag on the failure to protect the investor in 
the face of actions taken by human rights defenders. 
 
While it is difficult, at this moment in time, to definitively prove a causal impact of the 
international investment law regime on the rights of human rights defenders, the 
examples discussed above illustrate how the regime may exacerbate the repression and 
criminalization that human rights defenders face. In particular, where governments are 
faced with a choice between protecting the interests of investors, on the one hand, and 
complying with their obligations to protect, respect, and fulfill the rights of human rights 
defenders, on the other, the high stakes associated with investor-state arbitration can 
incentivize governments to prioritize the former even if at the direct expense of the latter.  
 
                                                        
21 Id., para. 6.25. 
22 In some cases tribunals also have extended the obligation to include legal security. 
23 Copper Mesa, para. 6.81. See also, e.g. ELSI v. USA, AAPL v. Sri Lanka, AMT v. Zaire, 
Lauder v. Czech Republic, Saluka v. Czech Republic, Plama v. Bulgaria, Noble Ventures v. 
Romania. 
24 Id. para. 6.82. 
25 Id. para. 6.83. 
26 Id., para. 6.83. 




States should analyze their obligations under international investment agreements to 
which they are a party and determine how their obligations under such agreements may 
impact their ability to realize their human rights obligations towards rights-holders, such 
as human rights defenders. To the extent a state’s obligations under an international 
investment agreement may be inconsistent with its obligations under other international 
legal instruments, states should, through “subsequent agreement” and “subsequent 
practice” make clear the meaning of their investment agreements to clarify that actions 
taken that may otherwise be inconsistent with their obligations under international 
investment agreement but that are taken with the objective of realizing the rights of 
human rights defenders should not result in treaty violations.28 In future treaties states 
should clarify this directly in the text of the treaty. States should decline to renew or 
terminate existing treaties with respect to which their obligations to investors are in 
theory or practice inconsistent with their obligations to human rights defenders.  
 
Prior to entering into any trade and investment agreement a human rights impact 
assessment should be conducted in order to, among other reasons, determine whether a 
trade and investment agreement would impose on a state any obligations that are 
inconsistent with its obligations under preexisting treaties. A state should refrain from 
entering into a trade and/or investment agreement when the obligations under such 
agreement are inconsistent with its obligations under existing human rights instruments.29 
 
These points could be highlighted in the guidance under the auspices of the foundational 
principles and operational principles under Pillar One. 
 
Pillar Two  
 
With respect to businesses, and more specifically, to the extent that businesses must 
identify, prevent, and mitigate human rights abuses against defenders, through both due 
diligence and their own activities and leverage, businesses should carefully consider 
whether the investment context itself may subtly create pressure to repress or criminalize 
human rights defenders protesting investment projects. Particularly in such a scenario, 
businesses must make clear to governments that they should not criminalize human rights 
defenders’ protest and efforts to defend their rights and interests in the context of 
                                                        
28 Lise Johnson, “Ripe for Refinement: The State’s Role in Interpretation of FET, MFN and 
Shareholder Rights,” GEG Working Paper 2015/101 (April 2015); David Gaukrodger, “The legal 
framework applicable to joint interpretative statements of investment treaties,” OECD Working 
Papers on International Investment,” 2016/01 (2016). 
29 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, Guiding principles 
on human rights impact assessments of trade and investment agreements, A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 
(19 Dec. 2011). For a discussion of how investment law and human rights law may compete or 
even conflict with respect to land investments and options for states in this context, see Kaitlin Y. 
Cordes, Lise Johnson and Sam Szoke-Burke, “Land Deal Dilemmas: Grievances, Human Rights, 
and Investor Protections,” CCSI (March 2016) available at 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/03/CCSI_Land-deal-dilemmas.pdf. 
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investment projects, and should further participatory decision-making with all interested 
stakeholders in such scenarios.  
 
To the extent that a business decides to pursue investor-state arbitration arising out of a 
factual scenario involving the interests of third-parties, including human rights defenders, 
it should refrain from raising claims about “full protection and security” as they relate to 
human rights defenders’ legitimate efforts to protest investments or defend their rights in 
the context of investments. These points could be highlighted in the guidance under the 
auspices of the foundational principles and operational principles under Pillar Two. 
 
 
